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Abstract
I invoke agency theory to evaluate how top
executives’ compensation contracts are structured,
conditional on risk in the firm’s operating
environment, focusing on the total, fixed, and
variable components. The results suggest that
companies exert some effort to adhere to agency
theoretic principles in designing top executive
compensation contracts. However, imperfections in
the pay setting process mean that there is ample
room for powerful CEOs to seek rents.
Furthermore, when risk in the operating
environment is measured with volatility in returns,
non-CEO top executives sometimes bear greater
risk than CEOs, collecting a greater percentage of
their compensation in variable pay than most CEOs.
The results are most distinct in the extreme deciles
of volatility, suggesting that firms may be paying
greater attention to compensation design in the most
extreme settings of volatility. I offer potential
explanations for this phenomenon.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3475100

370

Asare: Top Executive Pay and Variability in Firm Operational Risk

1. INTRODUCTION
Top executive compensation continues to be a perplexing
topic for researchers and regulators alike. This is largely because
there are so many variables that play a role in determining an
optimal compensation for top executives, some of them
measurable, others not. For example, the executive’s level of risk
aversion is typically unknown and not all the actions she takes are
observable. Yet her compensation has to be designed to optimally
share risk in a way that provides her with adequate incentives
while meeting her reservation wage.
Early works in the area include (Holmstrom 1979,
Grossman and Hart 1983, and Holmstrom and Milgrom 1987.
Relatively more recent works that examine these issues include
Baker and Hall (2004), Christensen and Feltham (2005). I test
classic agency theoretic recommendations for efficiently
structuring managerial compensation by examining the
performance-pay relation conditional on different proxies in the
firm’s risk environment. As is typical in the literature, I assume the
executive is risk averse. I sort a data set of executive-firm-year
observations into deciles on measures of risk. I use the standard
deviation of cash flow from operations (scaled by average Net
Operating Assets, NOA) and that of Cumulative Annual Returns as
my measures of risk (e.g., Core et al. 1999).
I alternately regress measures of compensation (Total Pay,
Fixed Pay, and Variable Pay) on performance measures and
control variables. The performance measures are Return on Assets
(ROA) and Cumulative Annual Returns when the risk measure is
the standard deviation (SDV) of cash flows and it is Return on
Equity (ROE) when the sorting is based on SDV of Cumulative
Annual Returns.
I find that while compensation schemes largely adhere to
the tenets of agency theory, imperfections in the process leaves
room for rent extraction and other potential distortions like nonCEOs having more of their pay being variable than do CEOs.
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Since risk aversion tends to decrease as wealth increases (e.g.,
Becker 2006), one would ordinarily expect CEOs to have larger
proportion of variable pay than other top executives. Such
imperfections may be contributing to the notion of excessive CEO
compensation both in the popular press and sections of the
executive compensation research community (e.g., Core et al.
1999, Bol 2008, Bebchuk and Fried, 2002).
Conditional on variability in Cumulative Annual Returns,
CEOs in the Bottom 2 deciles of SDV of Cumulative Annual
Returns who are also chairs of the board have much larger
additional compensation even when risk in the environment is
relatively low. Though this could be because firms with less
volatile cash flows tend to be larger, and larger firms may require
more work of the CEO who is also chairman. For example, Baker
and Hall (2004) contends that size tends to drive a significant
portion of top executives’ pay. Furthermore, Xavier and Landier
(2008) liken competition for a CEO position as a winner takes all
tournament where small differences in talent can translate to very
large difference in compensation, with the most talented people
managing the largest firms.1
This paper contributes to the debate on top executive
compensation by showing that though companies face a
challenging job of designing optimal compensation contracts given
all the variables they have to consider, they largely adhere to
theoretical predictions. The paper does not explicitly assess
optimality of association between pay and performance nor
explicitly evaluate the pay-performance sensitivity2. It tests how
1

Another potential source of the sense of inflated top executive compensation is
that a significant portion of total compensation has little or no relation to
performance. These include pensions, severance pay and other perks such as
housing and transportation. Some of these tend to be in the “ALL OTHER” pay
category in ExecuComp. These tend to inflate top executive pay without any
clear link to performance.
2 Technically, performance-pay sensitivity is the change in the executive’s
wealth for a unit change in shareholder wealth. Instead of rates of changes, I
examine performance-pay relations in levels, with a focus on the components of
the compensation conditional on risk in the firm’s outputs.
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pay is structured conditional on a proxy for risk in the operating
environment and assuming a risk-averse agent. My findings help
shed some light on potential sources of inefficiency in the top
executive pay setting process. In particular, components of
compensation such as pensions, severance packages and other
perquisites that are not linked to performance and related
subjectivity in the pay setting process (e.g., Boll 2008) are
potential sources of inefficiency.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. I review the
pertinent literature and theory in the next section, present the
research design and data sources in Section 3 and the results in
Section 4. I discuss the results and conclude in Section 5.
2. LITERATURE AND BACKGROUND
Agency theory contends that in an ideal world, managers’
compensation should be designed in such a way that it creates a
separating equilibrium, attracting well suited candidates and
dissuading ill-qualified candidates from applying. This is also
known as a “first-best result” and in this setting, incentives are not
very difficult issues (e.g., Bolton and Dawatripont, 2005) but this
is only an idealized setting against which to judge real world
contracts (Christensen and Feltham 2005). One way to implement
a contract that gets close to the idealized result is, the task / job
description could be designed to include items that well qualified
candidates can easily do while those ill qualified would struggle to
complete. In practice, though such perfect job designs are difficult
to pull off. The problem is mitigated by credentials such as
education and experience, augmented by thorough interviews and
background checks.
According to agency theory, a major consideration in
structuring compensation is the level of risk aversion of the agent
(i.e., manager). Managers are generally assumed to be risk averse
and principals, risk neutral. The risk neutral assumption for the
principal (e.g. shareholders) is not unrealistic given the widely held
beliefs in well-diversified portfolios (e.g., Markowitz 1952). For
such a risk averse manager with a risk-neutral principal, the
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optimal compensation contract is to pay her a fixed salary (e.g.,
Grossman and Hart 1983). However, the level of risk aversion in
reality varies from manager to manager and shareholders are
unlikely to be universally risk neutral. Thus, the principal has to
provide the manager some incentives by sharing risk with her. But
the principal faces a tough compensation design problem as the
more risk averse a manager is the more costly it is to the principal /
investor to have the manager share some of the risk inherent in the
firm’s operations since she has to be compensated with a risk
premium for every additional unit of risk she bears. For example,
Lambert et al (1991) and Hall and Murphy (2002 and 2003) show
that it can be very expensive to have executives bear too much risk
because they tend to assign much lower valuation to risky
compensation such as stocks and options. In other words,
executives require higher risk premia the more risk averse they are.
However, the debate about top executive compensation
suggests that most top executives obtain the largest portion of their
compensation from stocks and stock options (e.g. Frydman and
Jenter 2010). This could be incompatible with the notion of the
average typical top executive being risk averse as stocks and stock
options can assign significant risk to the executive to the extent
that their values can vary widely, sometimes independent of the
executives’ performance (e.g., Bolton and Dewatripont 2005) and
can be correspondingly more costly to shareholders.
To induce an agent to accept a contract, the contract must
meet the agent’s reservation wage. That is, the compensation
should be at least as much as her next best alternative (e.g., Laffont
and Mortimort 2002, Christensen and Feltham 2005). Further, it
must be incentive compatible. That is, it must induce her to give
forth her best effort to satisfy her utility function. This suggests
that the typical top executive contract would have a mix of fixed
and variable compensation.
I apply agency theory’s prescription for how a risk-averse
manager should be compensated to top executives by examining
their pay performance relation conditional on the risk in the firm‘s
operating environment and the type of compensation.
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As risk in the firm’s environment increases, compensation
should shift more toward fixed and away from variable pay.
Furthermore, since the higher up a manager is in the organization,
the “closer” she is to shareholders, and so the more risk she can be
expected to bear compared to lower level executives, we should
observe higher level employees (i.e., the CEO) bear more risk in
her compensation than other executives, all else equal. This view is
also supported by the fact that risk aversion tends to decrease in
wealth (e.g., Becker 2006) and CEOs tend to be much wealthier
than other executives.
Though the manager’s actions may be unobservable, the
outputs of those actions often are. Not only are summary reports
such as the income available to investors, but investors can also
infer the quality of the effort the manager put forth (e.g. Bolton and
Dewatripont 2005) from outputs of her actions. The quality of the
earnings is one way investors can evaluate the quality of the
manager’s effort. I use the quality of earnings as a proxy for the
quality of effort that executives exerted and evaluate the role they
play in the executive’s compensation.
3. DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN
I obtain executive compensation and related data from
ExecuComp, company financial data from Compustat, and
company returns data from CRSP. I estimate risk in the operating
environment with two measures: variability in cash flows deflated
by average Net Operating Assets (NOA), and variability in returns.
I sort the data into deciles of the two variability measures.
These are the Standard Deviation (SDV) of Cash Flow from
Operations (CFO) scaled by NOA and the Standard Deviation of
Cumulative Annual Returns (e.g., Core et al. 1999). I estimate the
following regression for total as well as the primary components of
top executive compensation, fixed, and variable pay. I scale cash
flow from operations with Net Operating Assets (NOA) because
CFO typically derives from operating assets and larger NOA are
likely to generate larger cash flow from operations.
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The first estimation of the model is based on a sorting of
the standard deviation SDV of CFO/Average NOA. I subsequently
sort the data on SDV of Cumulative Annual Returns.
COMPENSATION = α + β1MEASURE + β2BTM + β3DACC +
β4LEVERAGE + β5LOSS + β6Z-SCORE + β7DUAL_CEOCHAIR
+ β8IND + β9YEAR + ε
(1)
Where
COMPENSATION = Alternately, Total Compensation, Fixed Pay,
and Variable Pay3.
PERFORM = Is the firm’s performance measure. It is alternately
Return on Assets (ROA) and Cumulative Annual Returns when the
data are sorted on Standard Deviation (SDV) of Cash flows (scaled
by Net Operating Assets), and PERFORM = Return on Equity
(ROE) when the data are sorted into deciles of Standard Deviation
(SDV) of Cumulative Annual Return.
BTM = Ratio of book value to market value of equity
DACC = The Modified Jones Model Discretionary Accruals
(Jones 1991, Dechow et al. 1995)
LOSS = 1 if the firm made a loss that year, 0 otherwise
Z-score = Zmijewski’s (1984) Z-score. Higher numbers imply
higher likelihood of financial distress
DUAL_CEOCHAIR = 1 if the CEO is also the chairman, 0
otherwise.
IND = Two digit SIC industry fixed effects
YEAR = Year fixed effects
ε = an error term that is ~N(0, σ2)
I present greater details of how Cumulative Annual
Returns, Net Operating Assets (NOA) and Discretionary Accruals

3

Fixed Pay is primarily composed of salary other non-variable pay. Variable
Pay of bonus, stock and stock option awards.
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(DACC), and the compensation variables are calculated in an
appendix to the paper.
I first use Return on Assets (ROA) as the performance
measure so that the pay-performance relation can be evaluated in
the context of both debt and equity investors. Next, I use
Cumulative Annual Returns as the performance measure to
evaluate the performance-pay relation of top executives from the
perspective of shareholders. Both measures are evaluated
conditional on volatility in cash flows (i.e., SDV of CFO/Average
NOA, the measure of risk in the operating environment).
Since stock returns are another source of risk in the firm’s
operating environment. I next evaluate the model based on a
sorting on the SDV of Cumulative Annual Returns. The
performance measure in this case is Return on Equity (ROE). The
variability measures (SDV of CFO/Average NOA and SDV of
Cumulative Annual Returns) are estimated from the five prior
years’ CFO / Average NOA and Cumulative Annual Returns.
I control for the quality of the executive’s effort with
Modified Jones Model Discretionary accruals (Jones 1991,
Dechow et al. 1995). I control for the risk of financial distress with
Zmijewski’s Z-score and leverage with Debt / Total Assets. Since
losses are less common because of the protection that bankruptcy
provides, I control for loss years. CEOs who also chair the board
tend to have much more power (e.g., Bebchuck and Fried 2002). I
control for the notion of managerial power with CEO-chair
Duality.
Since the financial crisis of 2007-2009, there has been
strong public and regulatory outcry against what is perceived as
excessive executive compensation. For example, this resulted in
the curbing of top executive compensation at Troubled Asset
Relief Program (TARP) firms (e.g., Shearman and Sterling 2008)
for several years. It has also resulted in the SEC mandating such
measures as “Say on Pay” where shareholders get to vote for or
against top executive compensation proposals (SEC 2011).
Currently firms are being required to report the multiple of the
average employee’s pay that the CEO gets (see for example,
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Murphy 2012 and Eavis 2015). The crises period likely disrupted
the usual norms of how top executive pay is structured. Therefore,
I test the theories with data from 1992 to 2006 (the Execucomp
data base started in 1992).
I require firms to have sufficient data to estimate the
variability measures, the Modified Jones Model Discretionary
Accrual measure, and all other variables used in the models. After
excluding financial sector and utility companies, the final data set
has 76,009 executive-firm-year-executive observations spanning
1992 to 2006. I winsorize the data at the 1.25% and 98.75% levels.
4. RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
The average Total Compensation is $1.7 million with a
standard deviation of $2.5 million, with variable pay being the
largest component as indicated earlier – about $1 million versus
$600 thousand for fixed pay (Table 1). With a standard deviation
of $1.8 million for Total Variable Pay, most of the variability in
total pay derives from Total Variable Pay compared to $800
thousand for Total Fixed Pay. There is also a wide range of firm
sizes. Average Assets is $3 billion with a standard deviation of
$6.5 billion. Similarly, the mean market Value if $4 billion, with a
standard deviation of $9.7 billion. However, note that these
average compensation and firm size numbers are likely larger for
more recent years.
Mean ROA is 5%, Return on Equity (ROE), 7%, and
Cumulative Annual Return, 17%. The disparity between
accounting (ROA and ROE) and market returns is at least partly
explained by the differences in how accounting and the markets
operate (GAAP’s asymmetrical conservatism versus the different
levels of market efficiency). These differences provide further
support for using both as gauges of risk in the firm’s operating
environment.
Differences Between Top and Bottom Two Deciles.
Except for Total Compensation and CEO-chair Duality which are
almost equal (p=.06 and .09 respectively) there are striking
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differences in all variables between the top and bottom two deciles
(all p-values of differences in means <.01, see Table 2a). As
expected, the top two deciles have lower Book-to-Market ratios
(reflecting greater market value growth along with the volatility).
Though the two groups pay almost the same Total Compensation
(about $1.74 and $1.8 for the top and bottom two deciles
respectively), the top deciles of volatility pay a greater proportion
in variable pay (about 73% versus 56%) likely reflecting the
larger market values; Book-to-Market is much lower for the top
two deciles, and growing firms tend to pay greater proportion in
equity in part to align executive and shareholder interests and
sometimes to attract top talent in spite of cash constraints.
Furthermore, their relatively higher market values can help reduce
the risk premium (e.g., Hall and Murphy 2002 and 2003)
associated with stock-based compensation. Less risky firms
(bottom two deciles) are larger both by Total Assets and Market
value.
Differences Between CEOs and Non-CEOs. Table 2b
shows the differences in means and medians for CEOs and nonCEO top executives. While all the compensation and position
related variables are significantly different between the two
groups, there is no significant difference between the two groups in
almost all the company-level variables.
The correlations among the primary variables are in Table
3. Unsurprisingly the correlation amongst the compensation
variables are high. While most other correlations are significant at
the .05 level, they tend to be small.
Multivariate Results
I first present the results of the pay-performance measure
relations across all sorting of volatility measures before turning to
presenting the results of the control variables, especially since the
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control variables behave similarly across all the different sorting of
the risk measures4.
Sorting on SDV (CFO / NOA) with ROA as
Performance Measure. The results of estimating Equation 1
based on a sorting of the standard deviation (SDV) of Cash Flow
from Operations / Average Net Operating Assets SDV (CFO / Avg
NOA) are in Table 4. The first three columns reflect Total Pay as
the dependent variable for the Bottom 2, Middle 6, and Top 2
deciles of SDV (CFO/NOA) respectively. The next three columns
reflect the Fixed Pay component of Total Pay, and the last three,
the Variable Pay component.
The insights from the univariate analysis are partly borne
out here. For Total Pay, there is a monotonic decline in the payperformance relation as measured by ROA as volatility increases
(for all executives), though the incremental decline for executives
who are CEOs as volatility increases is not monotonic (see Figure
1a). The decline in the pay-performance relation as volatility
increases comes from both fixed and variable pay for all top
executives (The ROA variable declines across the board in Table
4; also see Figures 1b and 1c).
Being the CEO increases an executive’s Total Pay
significantly. Interestingly, when risk in the environment is low
(the Bottom 2 deciles), most of the incremental CEO pay is
variable while for more risky firm environments (Middle 6 and
Top 2 deciles), incremental pay for being CEO come in the form of
Fixed Pay (see the Executive is CEO variable in Table 4).
The diagrammatic presentation of incremental CEO
compensation for fixed and variable is more interesting. Most
CEOs (Middle 6 deciles) get most of their incremental
compensation in Fixed Pay – incremental variable pay is 40% for
this group (see Figure 1b, c, and d.) Also, there is a strong relation
between ROA and Fixed Pay for this group while the relation
between ROA and Variable Pay is insignificant.
4

All models are estimated with White-corrected robust standard errors,
significantly mitigating concerns about heteroskedasticity (e.g., Greene 2003).
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Figures 1b, c, and d suggest that variable pay is a large
component of incremental pay for executives who are CEOs in the
Bottom 2 and Top 2 deciles of cash flow volatility (though only the
Bottom 2 is significant in Table 4). The incremental pay
percentages for the Bottom 2 and Top 2 deciles of volatility are
80% and about 83% respectively composed of variable pay.
Basing a large component of a CEO’s compensation on
variable pay when risk in the operating environment is low is
consistent with agency theory (e.g. Bolton and Dewatripont 2005).
Basing more than 80% of a CEO’s incremental pay on variable pay
when risk in the environment is high can also be consistent with
self-selection where less risk averse CEOs seek out firms that pay
more in variable pay. Another contributing factor is that firms in
the top two deciles of volatility are growth firms (low book-tomarket), smaller, and riskier (higher Z-scores). Therefore, they are
more likely to face cash constraints that can compel them to offer
more stock-based compensation.
Sorting on SDV (CFO / NOA) with Cumulative Annual
Returns as Performance Measure. Table 5 shows the results of
estimating the model with Cumulative Annual Return as the
performance measure conditional on risk in cash flows. With
market returns as the performance measure, it appears that most
executives are protected from market reaction to performance. This
is evidenced in the negative or insignificant coefficient on
Cumulative Annual Return.
This result suggests that firms attempt to meet executives’
reservation wages and utilities in spite of market reaction to the
actions they take. This is consistent with an agency theoretic
setting where the principal attempts to balance incentives with risk
sharing, knowing that the agent taking a good action can still result
in a bad outcome. While Holmstrom’s informativeness principle
argues that all information that can provide insight on the
manager’s actions should be used in evaluating the manager, by
the same token, information that does not inform on the manager’s
actions or effort should be excluded as such information only add
noise (Holmstrom 1979, Holmstrom and Milgraom 1987). Thus,
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conditional on volatility in cash flows, it is possible that returns are
a noisy measure that firms may ignore in the compensation setting
process. As a practical example, an executive can make
investments that can cause volatility in current or near-term cash
flow but not affect returns till several years hence.
Even for executives who are CEOs the incremental pay for
the Middle 6 and Top 2 deciles of volatility come from fixed pay.
It is only for the Bottom 2 deciles of volatility that the incremental
pay for CEOs come from Variable Pay, consistent with treating
CEOs as largely risk averse.
Sorting on SDV of Cumulative Annual Returns with
ROE as Performance Measure (results in Table 6). Having
ROE as the performance measure implies that top executives are
being evaluated on their performance for shareholders, not
necessarily for all capital providers. The pay-performance relation
for top executives declines monotonically from the Bottom 2 to the
Top 2 deciles for Total Pay, Fixed Pay, and Variable Pay for all
executives (See the Return on Equity variable in Table 6). This
result again is consistent with agency theory in that the principal
partially shields the agent from variability in compensation as risk
in the firm’s environment increases.
However, for CEOs, the incremental pay-performance
relation is increased conditional on the risk in the market returns.
While in terms of Total Pay, the increase in the performance-pay
relation appears monotonic (see Executive is CEO in first three
columns of Table 6), there are important differences in how the
increase is distributed conditional on risk in market returns. For the
Bottom 2 deciles, almost all the incremental pay from being a CEO
comes from Fixed Pay, suggesting that this may be the most riskaverse CEOS. For the Middle 6 deciles, about 34% of the
incremental pay for being CEO comes from Fixed Pay. Though
only about 29% of the incremental pay for being CEO comes from
fixed pay for the Top 2 deciles of SDV of returns, both the fixed
and variable components are almost insignificant (p<.10),
suggesting that performance-pay relation for CEOs is weakened as
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risk increases. Again, these results are consistent with agency
theory assuming a risk averse CEO.
Interestingly, except for the Middle 6 deciles, top
executives in general get a larger portion of their total pay in
variable form than do CEOs. For top executives in general, it is
about 60%, 59.4% and 60% for the Bottom 2, Middle 6 and Top 2
deciles respectively. The corresponding ratios for CEOs on the
other had are 32%, 64% are 53% respectively. Again, this may
reflect differences in bargaining power between CEOs and other
top executives, self-selection of highly risk averse CEOs into low
risk firm environments, and less risk averse CEOs into
environments that offer relatively more risk and potential reward
or more likely, a combination of the two.
These patterns are presented diagrammatically in figures 2a
– 2d. Besides the possibility of non-CEOs having lower bargaining
power in their compensation setting processes, it is also possible
that non-CEO top executives tend to have lower levels of risk
aversion and are willing to challenge themselves more in their
quest to reach the corner office. This ambition may compel some
of them to take more variable pay to motivate themselves and to
show that they “have what it takes” to be CEO.
Control Variables. Across all models, Book-to-Market is
negatively related to compensation, reflecting the fact that high
market value firms tend to pay their top executives more, though
the amount generally decreases as risk increases. I control for the
quality of the executive’s output with the Modified Jones Model
Discretionary Accruals (Jones 1991 and Dechow et al. 1995).
Negative discretionary accruals are income decreasing and positive
ones are income increasing. The significant coefficients suggests
that boards of directors tend to incorporate the quality of income
into compensation decisions, though the small coefficients suggest
their effects on compensation are not very large. The negative sign
on the coefficients imply that income decreasing discretionary
accruals are likely interpreted as higher quality income and
rewarded and vice-versa. Executives are able to increase their total
compensation by levering up their capital structure. They reap the
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benefits of leverage primarily through Fixed Pay. Losses are
generally negatively associated with compensation, but the effects
are quite small for CEOs.
Interestingly, financial distress (measured by Zmijewski’s
Z-score (Zmijewski 1984) is incrementally positively related to
Variable Pay for the Middle 6 and Top 2 deciles of risk. This could
be related to valuable equity and options-based offers made to
attract executives to distressed companies or induce them to stay.
The only systematic pattern between CEO-Chair Duality
and compensation emerges when risk is measured in terms of
market returns (Table 6). In the Bottom 2 and Middle 6 deciles of
risk, CEOs who are also chairs of the board command significantly
higher premia for being chairs and the incremental pay decreases
in risk. This suggests some level of self-selection with the most
risk averse CEOs going to firms with lower risk in market returns
or CEOs using their positions as chairs of the board to extract rents
from shareholders. It is also possible that CEOs who are also chairs
of the board are just being paid to do more work as the firms with
less risk also tend to be larger (e.g., Baker and Hall 2004).
Sensitivity Tests with Current and Non-Current Pay
In sensitivity tests in which the dependent variable is
alternately Current Pay (salary and bonus, i.e., cash pay) and NonCurrent Pay (largely deferred stocks and options), the tenor of the
general results holds with the following exceptions. Executives’
Current Pay is positively related to Cumulative Annual Returns in
a monotonically decreasing fashion as cash flow risk increases.
However, they are protected from market effects on their stockand option-related pay as the relation between Cumulative Annual
Returns and Non-current Pay is negative, with the largest
“protection” (i.e., largest negative coefficient) on the Bottom 2
declines of cash flow risk (see Table 7).
A diagrammatic presentation of the coefficients on
Cumulative Annual Return for All Executives and for Executive is
CEO for both Current Pay and Non-current Pay is presented in
Figure 3a and 3b. This result is also consistent with the principal
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shifting compensation from the relatively more variable stocks and
options to the more stable salary and bonus as risk in the operating
environment increases. The larger Current Pay coefficients as
volatility in cash flows decline reinforces the possibility of some
extent of self-selection of top executives into firms depending on
their level of risk aversion. Since the results of the other sorting of
the data are very similar to those presented previously, I do not
present them.
Sensitivity Tests with the Middle 6 Deciles
It is possible that firms systematically set compensation
contracts for most top executives conditional on the volatility in
the outputs of the firm’s operating environment. If so, examining
the “hold out” sample of the middle six deciles will exhibit a
systematic pattern of results consistent with agency theory such as
declining relation between pay and performance as volatility
increases. On the other hand if only firms in situations of extreme
volatility devote significant effort to structuring the components of
pay (e.g., more fixed or current pay relative to variable or noncurrent pay in high volatility settings) then there will be no
systematic pattern observed when the Middle 6 deciles are
examined in greater detail.
To test this, I re-estimate the models but for only the
Middle 6 deciles of volatility. The only result that displays a
systematic pattern that can be interpreted as a consistent with
agency theory is the regression of Current Pay on ROA and control
variables, conditional on volatility in cash flows (i.e., sorted on
SDV (CFO/Avg NOA)). This suggests that firms likely exert more
effort in designing compensation contracts in extreme settings of
volatility compared to moderate volatility settings. The results of
examining the Middle 6 deciles in greater detail suggests that in
non-extreme volatility situations (i.e., moderate volatility) firms
focus on linking the Current Pay component of compensation with
a broad accounting measure like ROA and de-emphasize other
measures. There is an almost monotonic decline in the relation
between Current Pay and ROA as volatility in cash flows increases
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(see Table 8). Since current pay is composed of only salary and
bonus, it appears that companies do not systematically calibrate
volatility in cash flows and stock prices into their stocks and
options-based compensation contracts in moderate volatility
settings.
In turn, the relative exclusion of stock and stock-related
compensation in non-extreme volatility settings may be
contributing to the notion of managerial power and rent extraction
in both academic scholarship on top executive compensation and
in the popular press (e.g., Bebchuk 2009, Bebchuk and Fried 2002,
and Desai 2012).
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This paper tests agency theory’s efforts to explain how
managerial compensation should be set conditional on the risk in
the operating environment and assuming the manager is risk
averse. It is a difficult problem since managerial actions are not
fully observable and so she has to be incentivized to take the
desired actions. The need to provide the manager with incentives
often means providing her with variable pay which is less desirable
the more risk averse the manger is (e.g., Hall and Murphy 2002).
The results of the paper suggest that companies attempt to strike
this balance and while they largely succeed in striking a good
balance between providing incentives and meeting the manager’s
reservation wage and utility, imperfections in the contracting
process (for example, unobservable managerial actions) and
differences in bargaining power can allow some CEOs to collect
rents (e.g., Bebchuck and Fried 2002 and Morse et al. 2011).
This could be what is reflected in the significantly large
incremental compensation for being chair of the board in a firm
with low risk even as some non-CEO executives share more risk
than may be commensurate with their level of risk aversion. For
example, when volatility in stock returns is the measure of risk in
the operating environment non-CEO top executives tend to have a
greater share of their income in variable pay than CEOs (see
Figure 2d, which is derived from Table 6)
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Another potential contributor to the notion of inefficient top
executive compensation is that in moderate volatility settings,
companies seem to not deliberately structure the components of
compensation to reflect operating risk as they do in extreme
volatility settings.
Further research that examines the pay setting process of
non-CEO top executives and what motivates them can be fruitful.
For example, is it possible non-CEO top executives assume more
challenge / risk as a way to demonstrate their suitability for the top
job? Also, research that investigates if and how firms deliberately
consider and / or incorporate volatility in the operating
environment into compensation design can be very informative. To
this end Graham et al. (2012) present interesting research in the
context of CEOs (as opposed to all top executives) that points to
individual CEO “fixed effects” playing a much larger role in
determining compensation. However, Fee et al. (2013) contend
that most of Graham et al.’s results can be explained by exogenous
CEO changes. That is, when top-performing CEOs voluntarily
leave the firm, the firm tends to continue with the existing strategy
leaving CEO “fixed effects” to account for a much smaller
component of CEO compensation.
Research that examines the extent, if any, that significant
components of compensation like pensions and severance
packages that are seemingly unlinked to performance are
negotiated can also enhance researchers and regulators’
understanding of the top executive pay setting process.
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Appendix
1. Estimation of Cumulative Annual Return (CAR)
RET = (SPEND / SPBEG) – 1
Where
RET = Monthly returns
SPEND = Stock price at the end of the month
SPBEG = Stock price at the beginning of the month
CAR = EXP (ln∑(1 + RET)) – 1, where the summation is over the
12 months spanning each firm’s fiscal year.
Standard deviations are measured using the prior five years’ CARs.
2. Calculation of Net Operating Assets (NOA)
Total Operating Assets = Total Assets – Cash – Marketable
Securities – Cash Equivalents
Total Operating Liabilities = Total Liabilities – Long Term Debt –
Short Term Debt
Net Operating Assets (NOA) = Total Operating Assets – Total
Operating Liabilities
Standard deviations are calculated using the prior five years’ (CFO
/ Average NOA).
Average NOA = (NOAEND + NOABEG) / 2
Where
NOABEG = Beginning NOA
NOAEND = Ending NOA

3. Estimation of Discretionary Accruals (DISC-ACCRUAL)
Discretionary accruals are estimated using the Modified Jones
Model proposed by Dechow et al. (1995).
TACCt = α + β1(ΔREVt – ΔRECt) + β2PPEt + εt
Where
TACC = Total Accrual, measured as Net Income – Cash Flow
from Operations
ΔREV = Change in Revenue from the prior year
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ΔREC = Change in Accounts Receivables from the prior year
PPE = Property, Plant and Equipment
ε = Error term (residuals) representing the measure of discretionary
accruals.
The model is estimated at the 2-digit SIC code level and I require
there to be at least nine observations per SIC code to enter the
sample.
4. Background on Compensation Variables
Total Compensation (called TDC1 in Execucomp) = Salary +
Bonus + Other Annual Compensation + Restricted Stock Grants +
Long Term Incentive Payment Payouts + All Other + Value of
Option Grants.
Non-current Pay = Black Scholes value of stock option awards +
stock awards
Current Pay = Salary + Bonus
Variable Pay = Non-current Pay + stock option awards
Other Fixed Pay = Total Compensation – Variable Pay – Salary
Total Fixed Pay = Salary + Other Fixed Pay
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics - Primary Variables
Mean
Total Compensation (Thousands)
Return on Assets
Return on Equity
Cumulative Annual Return
Book-to-Market
Discretionary Accruals (Millions)
Zmijewski's Z-score
Total Fixed Pay (Thousands)
Total Variable Pay (Thousands)
Total Current Pay (Thousands)
Total Non-current Pay (Thousands)
Leverage (Debt / Assets)
Average Assets (Millions)
Market Value
Loss Year
CEO-chair Duality
Std Dev of CFO / Avg NOA
Std Dev. of Cumulative Annual Returns
N

$1675.82
0.05
0.07
0.17
0.49
$-120.70
5.29
$615.64
$1017.65
$606.57
$742.08
0.26
$3,013.01
$4,028.96
0.20
0.18
0.10
0.48
76,009

1st
Quartile
$444.93
0.01
0.03
-0.15
0.25
$-104.78
2.44
$233.31
$144.60
$275.00
$0.00
0.09
$328.13
$381.41
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.20

Median
$849.11
0.06
0.12
0.10
0.41
$-14.50
3.79
$358.60
$402.03
$431.25
$201.17
0.25
$817.83
$951.36
0.00
0.00
0.02
0.35
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3rd
Std. Dev.
Quartile
$1784.24 $2465.48
0.10
0.13
0.19
0.34
0.38
0.54
0.62
0.39
$21.93
$452.63
5.96
5.55
$634.40
$811.64
$1035.55 $1826.31
$721.59
$545.29
$697.82 $1543.56
0.39
0.20
$2,383.14 $6,546.61
$2,960.86 $9,654.44
0.00
0.40
0.00
0.38
0.05
0.31
0.59
0.46
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Table 2a: Mean and Median Differences of Top and Bottom Deciles
Mean
Mean
(Top 2
(Bottom 2
Deciles)
Deciles)
Total Compensation (Thousands)
$1,737.00 $1,798.01
Return on Assets (Millions)
0.02
0.05
Return on Equity
0.02
0.10
Cumulative Annual Return
0.20
0.15
Book-to-Market
0.38
0.53
Discretionary Accruals (Millions))
$-64.89
$-190.36
Zmijewski's Z-score
7.16
4.00
Total Fixed Pay (Thousands)
$465.38
$769.93
Total Variable Pay (Thousands)
$1,210.15 $983.59
Total Current Pay (Thousands)
$506.93
$701.77
Total Non-current Pay (Thousands)
$969.36
$666.34
Leverage (Debt / Assets)
0.19
0.33
Average Assets (Millions)
$1,333.38 4743.26
Market Value (Millions)
$2,763.31 $5567.15
Loss Year
0.29
0.14
CEO-chair Duality
0.17
0.18
Std. Dev of CFO / Avg. NOA
0.44
0.01
Std. Dev. of Cumulative Annual Returns
0.70
0.33
n
13,013
13,361

p-value

0.06
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.09
0.00
0.00
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Median
(Top 2
Deciles)
$811.28
0.06
0.12
0.06
0.29
$-5.87
4.81
$288.64
$433.95
$365.47
$263.82
0.10
$399.37
$690.47
0.00
0.00
0.17
0.51
13,013

393

Median
(Bottom 2
Deciles)
$948.47
0.05
0.12
0.11
0.45
$-30.36
3.19
$444.04
$415.89
$515.11
$187.60
0.33
$1,534.30
$1,517.06
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.25
13,361

p-value

0.00
0.00
0.49
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.03
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.09
0.00
0.00
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Table 2b: Mean and Median Differences of CEO and Non-CEO Executives
Mean
Mean
p-value
(CEOs)
(NonCEOs)
Total Compensation (Thousands)
$3,406.14 $1,306.32
0.00
Return on Assets
0.05
0.05
0.21
Return on Equity
0.08
0.07
0.13
Cumulative Annual Return
0.16
0.18
0.01
Book-to-Market
0.49
0.49
0.92
Discretionary Accruals (Millions)
$-126.70 $-119.42
0.09
Zmijewski's Z-score
5.30
5.29
0.93
Total Fixed Pay (Thousands)
$1,129.02 $506.02
0.00
Total Variable Pay (Thousands)
$2,141.94 $777.56
0.00
Total Current Pay (Thousands)
$1,106.63 $499.79
0.00
Total Non-current Pay (Thousands)
$1,553.74 $568.76
0.00
Leverage (Debt / Total Assets)
0.26
0.26
0.34
Average Assets (Millions)
$3,137.48 $2,986.43
0.02
Market Value (Millions)
$4,253.88 $3,980.92
0.00
Loss Year
0.19
0.20
0.06
CEO-chair Duality
1.00
0.00
0.00
Std. Dev of CFO / Avg. NOA
0.09
0.10
0.48
Std. Dev. of Cumulative Annual Returns
0.47
0.48
0.06
N
13,375
62,634

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3475100

Median
(CEOs)
$1,954.87
0.06
0.12
0.09
0.41
$-15.99
3.77
$687.00
$1049.75
$855.21
$574.03
0.25
$865.85
$1,033.95
0.00
1.00
0.02
0.34
13,375

Median
(NonCEOs)
$730.08
0.06
0.12
0.10
0.41
$-14.19
3.79
$318.15
$340.09
$383.52
$172.38
0.25
$808.58
$934.00
0.00
0.00
0.02
0.35
62,634

p-value

0.00
0.13
0.06
0.30
0.94
0.02
0.48
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.18
0.00
0.00
0.06
0.00
0.06
0.12
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Table 3, Firm Performance and Top Executives' Pay: Correlation of Primary Variables
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
Total Compensensationn, 1 1
Return on Assets, 2
0.08** 1
Return on Equityy, 3
0.07** 0.62** 1
Cum. Annual Return, 4
0.01** 0.16** 0.11** 1
Book-to-Market, 5
-0.15** -0.20** -0.15** -0.23** 1
Discretionary Accruals, 6
-0.33** 0.10** 0.06** 0.03** .08** 1
Zmijewski's Z-score, 7
0.06** 0.36** 0.17** 0.19** -0.29** 0.08** 1
Total Fixed Pay, 8
0.66** 0.05** 0.07** 0
-0.08** -0.31** -0.10** 1
Total Variable Pay,9
0.93** 0.08** 0.06** 0.01** -0.16** -0.27** 0.12** 0.38** 1
Total Current Pay, 10
0.66** 0.14** 0.14** 0.03** -0.14** -0.32** -0.05** 0.61** 0.57** 1
Total Non-current Pay, 11
0.87** 0.05** 0.04** 0
-0.15** -0.24** 0.13** 0.30** 0.97** 0.41** 1
Leverage (Deb / Assets), 12 0.02** -0.20** -0.09**.07** .04** -0.12** -0.53** 0.14** -0.03** 0.12** -0.05** 1
Average Assets, 13
0.38** 0.03** 0.07** -0.03** -0.07** -0.74**-0.11** 0.42** 0.300**0.44** 0.24** 0.19** 1
Market Value, 14
0.44** 0.15** 0.14** 0.02** -0.21** -0.60** 0.10** 0.36** 0.40** 0.43** 0.35** 0.01
0.79** 1
Loss Year, 15
-0.06** -0.68**-0.51** -0.13** 0.21** -0.09** -0.18** -0.07** -0.05** -0.15** -0.01** 0.11** -0.06** -0.12** 1
CEO-chair Duality, 16
0.32** 0.01
0.01
-0.01* 0
-0.01 0
0.29** 0.28** 0.42** 0.24** 0
0.01* 0.01** -0.01 1
SDV of CFO / NOA, 17
0.03** -0.10** -0.06**0.01** -0.09** 0.03** 0.08** -0.04** 0.05** -0.03** 0.06** -0.08** -0.06** -0.01** 0.08** 0
SDV. of Cum. Annual Ret, 18 0.02** -0.05** -0.06** -0.01 0.06** 0.06** 0.14** 0.14** -0.10** 0.06** -0.10** 0.08** -0.14** -0.09** 0.10** -0.01
p -values in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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1
0.15** 1

18

Table 4: Relation Between Firm ROA and Executives' Total, Fixed, and Variable Pay Respectively SDV
of CFO-to-Avg NOA Sort)
Dependent Variable:
Deciles of Volatility:
Intercept

Total Pay
Fixed Pay
Bottom 2
Middle 6
Top 2
Bottom 2
Middle 6
Top 2
Bottom 2
522.851
478.052**
260.330
248.801
346.115***
237.908***
335.791
(0.118)
(0.034)
(0.528)
(0.211)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.143)
Return on Assets
3395.569**
1991.597***
956.660***
1422.725***
730.572***
249.565***
1893.645*
(0.011)
(0.000)
(0.001)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.086)
Executive is CEO
1997.032**
1501.419***
1588.269*
324.572
645.948***
204.828***
1652.912**
(0.013)
(0.005)
(0.094)
(0.303)
(0.008)
(0.002)
(0.019)
Book-to-Market
-713.783***
-624.163***
-526.177***
-151.687***
-117.255***
-53.567**
-540.714***
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.027)
(0.000)
Discretionary Accruals
-1.570***
-1.682***
-1.994***
-0.585***
-0.512***
-0.272***
-0.889***
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
Leverage (Debt / Assets)
661.097*
351.335**
637.547**
203.867*
260.964***
220.745***
412.612
(0.067)
(0.044)
(0.017)
(0.093)
(0.000)
(0.001)
(0.157)
Loss Year
44.992
-26.567
-173.987
0.015
-40.688**
-15.164
45.639
(0.765)
(0.675)
(0.118)
(1.000)
(0.049)
(0.580)
(0.701)
Zmijewski's Z-score
-25.493
9.731
28.550***
-22.439***
-15.218***
-4.672***
-4.487
(0.173)
(0.401)
(0.009)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.002)
(0.776)
CEO-chair Duality
342.147
520.604
294.881
470.507
-43.142
233.532***
-242.385
(0.670)
(0.334)
(0.757)
(0.135)
(0.860)
(0.001)
(0.731)
Sector & Year Fixed-Effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
N
13361
49635
13013
13361
49635
13013
13361
Adj R-squared
0.356
0.273
0.232
0.339
0.245
0.195
0.269
p-values in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. All models are estimated with robust standard errors.

Variable Pay
Middle 6
175.152
(0.237)
1203.586***
(0.000)
577.083
(0.123)
-499.526***
(0.000)
-1.057***
(0.000)
52.407
(0.690)
10.430
(0.829)
20.402**
(0.039)
747.392**
(0.047)
Yes
49635
0.229

Table 5: Relation Between Firm Returns and Executives' Total, Fixed, and Variable Pay Respectively (SDV
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Top 2
36.482
(0.915)
685.352***
(0.008)
1376.988
(0.147)
-436.535***
(0.000)
-1.470***
(0.000)
398.296*
(0.090)
-128.316
(0.172)
29.455***
(0.001)
-78.149
(0.935)
Yes
13013
0.215
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of CFO-to-Avg NOA Sort)
Dependent Variable:
Deciles of Volatility:
Intercept

Total Pay
Fixed Pay
Variable Pay
Bottom 2
Middle 6
Top 2
Bottom 2
Middle 6
Top 2
Bottom 2
Middle 6
887.603**
523.942**
257.162
382.853*
362.644***
234.581***
555.948***
205.541
(0.011)
(0.015)
(0.490)
(0.085)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.008)
(0.143)
Cumulative Annual Return
-213.142**
-15.905
-59.227
20.971
-4.777
17.258
-217.183***
-18.819
(0.012)
(0.628)
(0.288)
(0.464)
(0.561)
(0.154)
(0.001)
(0.485)
Executive is CEO
1955.255**
1358.819***
1636.063*
317.641
593.837**
224.520***
1620.187**
489.171
(0.019)
(0.009)
(0.078)
(0.317)
(0.017)
(0.001)
(0.025)
(0.160)
Book-to-Market
-846.125***
-660.169***
-521.392***
-181.222***
-130.206***
-41.502*
-637.624***
-523.529***
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.096)
(0.000)
(0.000)
Discretionary Accruals
-1.551***
-1.661***
-1.973***
-0.581***
-0.505***
-0.269***
-0.875***
-1.044***
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
Leverage (Debt / Assets)
568.051
331.560*
647.062**
161.977
253.689***
223.881***
363.312
40.638
(0.118)
(0.059)
(0.016)
(0.181)
(0.000)
(0.001)
(0.210)
(0.759)
Loss Year
-341.339***
-338.256***
-484.424***
-151.412***
-154.930***
-94.162***
-179.122**
-178.752***
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.015)
(0.000)
Zmijewski's Z-score
-2.468
22.274**
33.968***
-13.527***
-10.629***
-3.741**
9.008
28.085***
(0.887)
(0.045)
(0.002)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.019)
(0.542)
(0.003)
CEO-chair Duality
383.974
664.509
245.276
477.744
9.458
213.858***
-209.887
835.997**
(0.646)
(0.201)
(0.793)
(0.132)
(0.970)
(0.002)
(0.772)
(0.017)
Sector & Year Fixed-Effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
N
13361
49635
13013
13361
49635
13013
13361
49635
Adj R-squared
0.352
0.270
0.230
0.334
0.242
0.193
0.268
0.226
*
**
***
p-values in parentheses; p < 0.10, p < 0.05, p < 0.01. All models are estimated with robust standard errors. Table 6:

Relation Between Firm ROE and Executives' Total, Fixed, and Variable Pay Respectively (SDV of
Returns Sort)
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Top 2
36.029
(0.907)
-66.194
(0.169)
1405.980
(0.133)
-440.967***
(0.000)
-1.454***
(0.000)
404.638*
(0.084)
-352.157***
(0.000)
33.687***
(0.000)
-108.793
(0.908)
Yes
13013
0.214
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Dependent Variable:
Deciles of Volatility:
Intercept
Return on Equity
Executive is CEO
Book-to-Market
Discretionary Accruals
Leverage (Debt / Assets)
Loss Year
Zmijewski's Z-score
CEO-chair Duality
Sector & Year Fixed-Effects
N
Adj R-squared
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Bottom 2
1034.132***
(0.000)
441.947***
(0.003)
390.373**
(0.035)
-825.908***
(0.000)
-1.377***
(0.000)
44.928
(0.872)
-196.398**
(0.031)
-10.480
(0.427)
1742.715***
(0.000)
Yes
14334
0.322

Total Pay
Middle 6
288.704
(0.269)
391.502***
(0.000)
892.708***
(0.006)
-584.789***
(0.000)
-1.703***
(0.000)
439.377**
(0.010)
-299.697***
(0.000)
17.788*
(0.056)
1142.192***
(0.000)
Yes
45713
0.282

Top 2
645.608***
(0.001)
297.185**
(0.020)
3380.216***
(0.001)
-653.428***
(0.000)
-2.039***
(0.000)
693.650***
(0.005)
-112.318
(0.274)
35.735***
(0.002)
-1330.743
(0.187)
Yes
15962
0.244

Bottom 2
396.246***
(0.000)
148.821***
(0.001)
304.034**
(0.020)
-175.886***
(0.000)
-0.469***
(0.000)
21.478
(0.810)
-115.200***
(0.000)
-18.071***
(0.000)
400.541***
(0.003)
Yes
14334
0.288

Fixed Pay
Middle 6
318.105***
(0.009)
134.698***
(0.000)
306.336***
(0.001)
-119.555***
(0.000)
-0.564***
(0.000)
257.297***
(0.000)
-116.130***
(0.000)
-11.408***
(0.000)
323.353***
(0.001)
Yes
45713
0.270

Top 2
278.471***
(0.000)
95.417***
(0.005)
951.558*
(0.084)
-51.653*
(0.051)
-0.345***
(0.000)
303.832***
(0.000)
-43.067
(0.116)
-3.974***
(0.002)
-491.288
(0.370)
Yes
15962
0.180

Bottom 2
637.992***
(0.000)
266.010**
(0.015)
75.258
(0.763)
-642.925***
(0.000)
-0.839***
(0.000)
13.650
(0.951)
-73.143
(0.295)
5.726
(0.585)
1236.849***
(0.000)
Yes
14334
0.261

Variable Pay
Middle 6
31.066
(0.848)
232.806***
(0.000)
590.033**
(0.045)
-458.382***
(0.000)
-1.008***
(0.000)
151.020
(0.243)
-171.634***
(0.000)
25.612***
(0.001)
720.193**
(0.015)
Yes
45713
0.222

p-values in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. All models are estimated with robust
standard errors, mitigating concerns about heteroskedasticity.
Table 7: Relation Between Firm Returns and Executives' Current Non-current Pay Respectively (SDV
of CFO-to-Avg NOA Sort)

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3475100

Top 2
367.388**
(0.020)
177.626*
(0.076)
1768.357*
(0.072)
-559.911***
(0.000)
-1.511***
(0.000)
341.605
(0.108)
-90.643
(0.278)
33.972***
(0.000)
-330.069
(0.738)
Yes
15962
0.233
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Dependent Variable:
Deciles of Volatility:
Intercept
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Current Pay
Non-current Pay
Bottom 2
Middle 6
Top 2
Bottom 2
Middle 6
790.049***
501.293***
299.196***
112.632
31.966
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.524)
(0.786)
Cumulative Annual Return
42.484**
27.083***
21.174**
-256.719***
-56.020**
(0.012)
(0.000)
(0.014)
(0.000)
(0.018)
Executive is CEO
597.642
396.674***
251.928*
1093.166
419.689
(0.161)
(0.000)
(0.067)
(0.137)
(0.213)
Book-to-Market
-191.289***
-154.053***
-64.364***
-477.816***
-405.526***
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.002)
(0.000)
(0.000)
Discretionary Accruals
-0.357***
-0.366***
-0.286***
-0.625***
-0.768***
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
Leverage (Debt / Assets)
139.152
153.506***
188.655***
321.140
-33.270
(0.111)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.197)
(0.763)
Loss Year
-177.972***
-202.844***
-196.139***
-56.662
-27.576
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.374)
(0.351)
Zmijewski's Z-score
-9.486***
-7.090***
-0.824
13.922
29.031***
(0.003)
(0.000)
(0.671)
(0.262)
(0.000)
CEO-chair Duality
104.640
210.123**
197.379
-112.241
531.512
(0.805)
(0.018)
(0.149)
(0.879)
(0.116)
Sector & Year Fixed-Effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
N
13361
49635
13013
13361
49635
Adj R-squared
0.452
0.388
0.310
0.210
0.188
p-values in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. All models are estimated with robust standard errors, mitigating
concerns about heteroskedasticity.
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Top 2
-35.025
(0.894)
-78.144*
(0.080)
1366.978
(0.152)
-373.287***
(0.000)
-1.164***
(0.000)
280.966
(0.188)
-203.915**
(0.010)
30.712***
(0.000)
-376.360
(0.694)
Yes
13013
0.198
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Figures 1a – 1d are based on the coefficients of the regression results in Table 4. The coefficients on
ROA correspond to All Executives in the diagram and the coefficients on Executive is CEO are the
incremental compensation for executives who are CEOs. The intercepts are not included in the
diagrams.
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Figures 2a – 2d are based on the coefficients of the regression results in Table 6. The coefficients on
ROA correspond to All Executives in the diagram and the coefficients on Executive is CEO are the
incremental compensation for executives who are CEOs. The intercepts are not included in the
diagrams.
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Figures 3a and 3b are based on the coefficients of the regression results in Table 7. The coefficients on
ROA correspond to All Executives in the diagrams and the coefficients on Executive is CEO are the
incremental compensation for executives who are CEOs. The intercepts are not included in the
diagrams.
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Table 8: Breakup of Middle 6 Deciles: Relation Between Firm ROA and Executives' Current Pay (SDV
of CFO-to-Avg NOA Sort)
Decile 3
Decile 4
331.229***
532.946***
(0.000)
(0.000)
Return on Assets
1136.048***
1248.811***
(0.000)
(0.000)
Executive is CEO
461.705***
383.291***
(0.000)
(0.000)
Book-to-Market
-166.964***
-146.977***
(0.000)
(0.000)
Discretionary Accruals
-0.367***
-0.394***
(0.000)
(0.000)
Leverage (Debt / Assets)
75.326
260.827***
(0.354)
(0.000)
Loss Year
-97.504***
-36.233
(0.002)
(0.232)
Zmijewski's Z-score
-18.002***
-15.439***
(0.000)
(0.000)
CEO-chair Duality
206.495***
245.694***
(0.000)
(0.002)
Sector & Year Fixed-Effects
Yes
Yes
N
8159
8544
Adj R-squared
0.423
0.453
p-values in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Intercept

Decile 5
522.059***
(0.000)
956.757***
(0.000)
823.048***
(0.008)
-179.149***
(0.000)
-0.403***
(0.000)
199.345***
(0.009)
-66.759**
(0.026)
-12.688***
(0.000)
-184.468
(0.550)
Yes
8333
0.428
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Decile 6
443.911***
(0.000)
877.061***
(0.000)
49.107
(0.372)
-152.908***
(0.000)
-0.304***
(0.000)
320.588***
(0.000)
-34.414
(0.271)
-8.031***
(0.010)
561.629***
(0.000)
Yes
8476
0.384

Decile 7
571.757***
(0.000)
807.300***
(0.000)
348.098***
(0.001)
-106.011***
(0.000)
-0.335***
(0.000)
89.284
(0.195)
-67.105**
(0.013)
-10.513***
(0.000)
199.932*
(0.059)
Yes
8092
0.361

Decile 8
368.674**
(0.027)
794.880***
(0.000)
518.924***
(0.007)
-124.552***
(0.000)
-0.426***
(0.000)
122.682*
(0.071)
-32.754
(0.187)
-10.774***
(0.000)
9.921
(0.959)
Yes
8031
0.429

